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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ISMAIL ABDULLAHI MOHAMED, : Case No. 20110066-CA 
Appellant is incarcerated. 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellant Ismail Abdullahi Mohamed appeals from a Sentence, Judgment, 
Commitment for a conviction of Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled 
Substance, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) 
(2008); in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Deno Himonas, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0) (2008). See Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, 
Commitment) 
ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue I: Whether there was insufficient evidence presented by the State to support 
a conviction for Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance. 
Standard of Review: When considering a sufficiency of evidence claim, this Court 
will "review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ^ 15, 
63 P.3d 94. It "will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted." Id. (citing State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's decision this Court 
still has the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
verdict. The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap 
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment 
of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably 
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing 
court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not 
mean that the court can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in 
order to sustain a verdict. 
Id. (quoting Petree, 659 P.2d at 444-45). 
Preservation: Mr. Mohamed preserved this issue by making a motion for a 
directed verdict. R. 130: 119-20; see State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11, 14, 10 P.3d 
346 ("As a general rule, to ensure that the trial court addresses the sufficiency of the 
evidence, a defendant must request that the court do so."). Although Mr. Mohamed 
preserved this issue, if this Court finds preservation inadequate, it can be reviewed under 
the plain error doctrine. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ffif 12-15. 
STATUTORY PROVISION 
The following statutory provision is determinative of the issue on appeal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2008) - Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a 
Controlled Substance: 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
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(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: . . . 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(4) Prohibited acts D -- Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under 
this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, 
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to 
the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds 
the act is committed: . . . 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; . . . 
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, 
or grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii).1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
An Information was filed March 23, 2010, charging Mr. Mohamed with 
Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (2008). R. 1-2. A preliminary hearing 
was held April 20, 2010 binding Mr. Mohamed over on the charged offense. R. 15. 
A jury trial was held on September 29, 2010. R. 130. After the State presented its 
evidence, Mr. Mohamed made a motion for a directed verdict, which was denied. R. 130: 
119-120. The jury returned a guilty verdict on the charged offense. R.44-45; 130: 173-
175. Mr. Mohamed requested the trial court to give him credit for the nine months he 
served, and allow him to be admitted to inpatient treatment as part of his sentence. R. 
1
 The jury found that the alleged transaction took place in or within 1000 feet of such an 
area described in the statute. R. 44. Mr. Mohamed does not contest the location of the 
alleged transaction. 
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131: 3-4. The trial court denied both of these requests and sentenced Mr. Mohamed to the 
indeterminate term of five years to life at the state prison. R. 131:4. 
Mr. Mohamed filed a timely appeal. R. 122-23. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of March 18, 2010, Detective Parisot and Detective Johnson were 
working undercover in the area of 200 South, between West Temple and 600 West, 
looking for individuals involved in drug dealing. R. 130: 57-58. The detectives saw Mr. 
Mohamed outside of the Salt Lake City homeless shelter on 200 South and approached 
him. R. 130: 60. 
Mr. Mohamed is a Somali immigrant and English is not his first language. A 
certified Somali interpreter was used to allow Mr. Mohamed to understand what was said 
during the trial process. R. 130:14-15, 21. Detective Parisot testified that Mr. Mohamed 
conducted all of his communications with the detectives in English and when asked 
whether the Mr. Mohamed could understand what the detectives were saying to him, 
Detective Parisot stated "[w]e were able to carry on a conversation." Id. at 85. 
Detective Parisot said to Mr. Mohamed, "Hey, you got some work?" Id. at 61. Mr. 
Mohamed responded that he did not have any, but that he would help them find some. Id. 
Detective Parisot acknowledged that most people in the homeless shelter were 
unemployed and looking for work, however he maintained that Mr. Mohamed "was 
telling [the detectives that] he didn't have any cocaine, but [that] he would help [them] 
locate some cocaine." Id. at 61, 82. Detective Parisot did not use any other phrase to 
request the purchase of drugs, and he did not use the word cocaine or any common code 
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words such as "powder, rock, crack [or] white." Id. at 81, 56. While the detective did not 
use any of these words with Mr. Mohamed, he testified that undercover agents generally 
use these words in "an effort to . . . fit in [and] act like [they] belong" when working 
undercover. Id. at 56. 
Following this conversation, the three men set off together, walking east along 200 
South, towards the post office, because Mr. Mohamed had said "that's where a lot of the 
guys are" and they could probably "find some" there. Id. at 61-62, 83. Along the way, 
Mr. Mohamed approached several people and asked in English, "Hey, do you have some? 
Do you have some work?" Id. at 62. Not receiving an affirmative response, and finding 
no one at the post office, the three men set off again, this time heading west. Id. at 62-63. 
Upon reaching the Jackson Apartments on the corner of 300 West and 200 South, 
the detectives noticed that they were being followed by a "passive" male individual. Id. at 
63-64. He was Caucasian and spoke English. Id. at 84. This individual approached some 
men sitting outside the apartment building and solicited them for crack cocaine. Id. at 64, 
84. He appeared to be soliciting on his own behalf. Id. at 84-85. Detective Parisot 
testified that after the stranger's solicitation for crack, the men outside the apartment 
invited them all up to one of their apartments to buy crack. Id. at 64. The detectives 
refused, stating they were afraid of being robbed inside the apartment, to which Mr. 
Mohamed agreed that the men would likely rob them. Id. Mr. Mohamed and the 
detectives then continued walking west. Id. 
The detectives and Mr. Mohamed then encountered a man, later identified as 
Mohamed Osmond, 20 to 30 feet north of the corner of 200 South and Rio Grande Street. 
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Id. at 64-65. Detective Parisot testified that Mr. Mohamed approached Mr. Osmond and 
the two spoke in a language that Detective Parisot couldn't understand. Id. at 65-66. 
Following this conversation, which lasted about 5 to 10 seconds, Mr. Osmond turned to 
Detective Parisot and asked him in English, "How much?" Id. at 66. The detective 
responded "20" and when he pulled out a $20 bill, Mr. Osmond spit a bag out of his 
mouth and handed it to the detective. Id. at 66-67. This bag was later found to contain 
0.15 grams of crack cocaine. Id. at 88. Although the detective did not see Mr. Mohamed's 
facial expressions at the time, Mr. Mohamed said nothing while the transaction took 
place. Id. at 68-69. 
Following the transaction, Mr. Osmond quickly exited the area and the police were 
unable to arrest him until an hour later, when they found him again in the vicinity of the 
homeless shelter. Id. at 86, 70-71. However, Mr. Mohamed remained with the detectives 
as they left the corner of 200 South and Rio Grande Street and walked with them until the 
police responded to the "bust signal" and arrested him. Id. at 69-70, 86. Detective Parisot 
speculated that Mr. Mohamed stayed with the officers because he was expecting a 
"bump," or a broken-off piece of the crack cocaine in return for his helping the detectives 
obtain drugs. Id. at 86-87. The detective claimed that no special tools, such as a knife, are 
needed to break off a piece of the drug. Id. at 89-90. Detective Parisot did not record this 
suspicion that Mr. Mohamed followed him because he wanted a "bump" in his police 
report from that night. Id. at 90. 
Detective Parisot further testified that a small amount of crack cocaine, such as the 
one purchased from Mr. Osmond, is usually smoked in a glass pipe. Id. at 91-92. Mr. 
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Mohamed did not indicate to the detective that he had such a pipe nor was he found to 
have possessed any drug paraphernalia of this kind. Id. at 94. Mr. Mohamed was 
therefore not charged with possession of drug paraphernalia. Id. at 94. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse Mr. Mohamed's conviction where the marshaled 
evidence establishes the State failed to meet its burden. The evidence presented failed to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Mohamed knowingly and intentionally 
arranged to distribute crack cocaine. Furthermore, the insufficiency of the evidence 
constituted plain error, which should have been obvious to the trial court, the absence of 
which was reasonably likely to produce a more favorable outcome for Mr. Mohamed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE WHERE THE MARSHALED 
EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THAT MR. MOHAMED WAS GUILTY OF THE CHARGED 
OFFENSE. 
This Court will "reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when55 it concludes 
"as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction.55 State v. 
Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, f 10, 2 P.3d 954 (quotation omitted). It will "view the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict,55 and "will reverse only if the 
evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.55 Id. (quotations 
omitted). Though the burden of establishing insufficiency of the evidence "is high, it is 
not impossible.55 Id. (citation omitted). This Court "will not make speculative leaps across 
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gaps in the evidence." Id. (citation omitted). "Every element of the crime charged must 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (citation omitted). In other words, "[t]o affirm 
the jury's verdict," this Court "must be sure the State has introduced evidence sufficient 
to support all elements of the charged crime." Id. (citation omitted); see also Holgate, 
2000 UT 74,1| 18; State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, f 17, 993 P.2d 232. 
When making an insufficient evidence claim, the defendant "must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f 13, 
25 P.3d 985 (citations omitted). Proper marshaling requires the appellant to present "in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. 
Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis in original); see also State v. 
Maese, 2010 UT App 106, ffif 16-17, 236 P.3d 155. "After constructing this magnificent 
array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." 
Majestic Inv. Co, 818 P.2d at 1315; see also Kimball v. Kimball 2009 UT App 233, \ 20 
n.5,217P.3d733. 
As it reviews the marshaled evidence, this Court will "not sit as a second trier of 
fact." Boyd, 2001 UT 30, <|[ 16. Thus, "[s]o long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, [this Court's] inquiry stops." Id. Instead, this Court will simply 
"assume that the jury believed the evidence supporting the verdict." Id. (quotations and 
citation omitted); see State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, \ 30, 989 P.2d 1091 ("We may 
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not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility, but instead 'assume that the jury 
believed the evidence and inferences that support the verdict.'") (citation omitted). 
As demonstrated below, the marshaled evidence is insufficient to show Mr. 
Mohammed met the statutory requirements for the crime of distributing or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance. Additionally, and in the alternative, this lack of 
evidence constitutes plain error. 
A. The Marshaled Evidence Supporting the Verdict 
Under Utah law distribution or arrangement to distribute a controlled substance is defined 
in part as follows: 
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: . . . 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance. 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1) (2008). "To make out a prima facie case under the statute, 
the State must show that an offer, agreement, consent, or arrangement to distribute 
controlled substances was made by the defendant and, whichever variation or variations it 
charges, that the behavior was 'engaged in knowingly or with intent that such distribution 
would, or would be likely to, occur.'5' State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, ^  9, 3 P.3d 725 
{abrogated on other grounds by State v. Morales-Torres, 2001 UT App 246, 2001 WL 
911418), citing State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1979); see also State v. 
Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185, 1190 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "[I]f he intends the distribution for 
sale of a controlled substance, any act in furtherance of an arrangement therefor 
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constitutes the criminal offense described by the statute." Harrison, 601 P.2d at 924; 
State v. Gray, 111 P.2d 1313, 1320-21 (Utah 1986). 
Here, the marshaled evidence was "so inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that Mr. Mohamed intended 
to arrange the distribution of a controlled substance. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, \ 10 
(quotation omitted). Detective Parisot testified that he and another undercover officer 
approached Mr. Mohamed near a homeless shelter and asked "you got some work?" R. 
130:60-61. Mr. Mohamed responded that he did not have any but that he would help the 
detectives find some. Id. at 61. The detective assumed this meant that Mr. Mohammed 
"didn't have any cocaine, but [that] he would help [the detectives] locate some cocaine." 
Id 
Mr. Mohamed walked with the detectives towards the post office because Mr. 
Mohamed said they could probably "find some" there since "that's where a lot of the 
guys are." Id. at 83, 62. On the way, Mr. Mohamed approached several individuals and 
asked them in English, "Do you have some? Do you have some work?" Id. at 62. After 
having no success, and seeing that there was no one at the post office, they turned around 
and headed west. Id. at 62-63. The three men then walked past the Jackson Apartments 
where an unknown individual solicited crack cocaine from some men standing outside 
the building. Id. at 63-64. These residents of the apartment invited the unknown 
individual and the three men up to purchase crack cocaine. Id. at 64. The detective turned 
down the offer, explaining that he was afraid of being robbed, and Mr. Mohamed agreed 
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with the detective stating, "[d]on't go in there, I think they're planning on robbing you." 
Id. 
After walking further west, Mr. Mohamed approached Mr. Osmond off the corner 
of 200 South and Rio Grande Street and spoke to him in a foreign language. Id. at 64-65. 
The conversation lasted between 5 and 10 seconds, after which Mr. Osmond immediately 
turned to Detective Parisot and said "How much?" Id. at 66. The detective told him "20," 
Mr. Osmond spit out a bag from his mouth into his hand and traded it for the detective's 
$20 bill. Id. The detective testified that Mr. Mohamed said nothing while the transaction 
took place. Id. at 68-69. The bag was later determined to contain 0.15 grams of crack 
cocaine. Id. at 88. 
Mr. Mohamed remained "right with" the detectives as they left the scene of the 
transaction until he was arrested. Id. at 69. The officers speculated that this was because 
Mr. Mohamed wanted a piece of the cocaine as payment for helping them find a seller. 
Id. at 87. 
B. The Evidence Presented Was Not Sufficient To Show That Mr. Mohamed 
Distributed or Arranged To Distribute A Controlled Substance. 
In order for the State to sustain a conviction for a first degree felony it had to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Mohamed knowingly or intentionally 
committed some "act in furtherance of an arrangement" to distribute a controlled 
substance. Harrison, 601 P.2d at 924. The marshaled evidence, however, was so 
"inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
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reasonable doubt" that Mr. Mohamed knowingly or intentionally arranged for the 
distribution of a controlled substance. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, j^ 10. 
The evidence is insufficient to prove that Mr. Mohamed had the requisite 
knowledge or intent because it requires a "speculative leap[] across [a] gap[] in the 
evidence," Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, «([ 10, that is too great to constitute a mere 
"reasonable inference[]," Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ^ 16. This is because there is no evidence 
that Mr. Mohamed ever actually understood the code word for cocaine. In fact, the 
evidence tends to show that Mr. Mohamed understood the word "work" to mean 
employment. Detective Parisot acknowledged that he approached Mr. Mohamed outside 
of the homeless shelter, a place likely to draw people looking for work. R. 130: 82. The 
detective also acknowledged that he had no basis for his belief that Mr. Mohamed 
understood the question "you got some work" to be a solicitation for cocaine instead of 
employment. Id. He merely stated that he relied on his training and experience in making 
that assumption. Id. The detective further testified that he never used any other phrase to 
ask Mr. Mohamed for cocaine. Id. at 81. Additionally, the detective never heard Mr. 
Mohamed use words other than "work" to describe the object of their search. Id. at 62. 
Mr. Mohamed spoke to Mr. Osmond before the transaction in a different language, and 
there is no evidence of what was said, let alone whether it involved cocaine. Id. at 65-66. 
Thus, there is no indication from the evidence that Mr. Mohamed understood the secret 
meaning of the word "work;" instead the State required the jury to make a "speculative 
leap[]" over that gap. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, 1j 10. 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Moreover, reasonable minds would have entertained a reasonable doubt about Mr. 
Mohamed's understanding of the code word "work." English is not Mr. Mohamed5 s first 
language. In fact, during his trial he required a translator, and the trial could not start until 
the translator arrived. R.130: 14-15, 21. Although Detective Parisot testified that he was 
"able to carry on a conversation" with Mr. Mohamed in English, an apparent 
conversational ability does not support the conclusion that Mr. Mohamed understood the 
covert meaning for an English code word. Id. at 85. In fact, Mr. Mohamed only parroted 
back the detective's words "you got some work" that night, and never used any word 
other than "work." Id. at 62, 83-84. Considering these facts, the assumption that Mr. 
Mohamed knew "work" meant cocaine is so inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
would have had reasonable doubts about its accuracy. 
The evidence presented by the State supporting the arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance charge was so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that [Mr. Mohamed] 
committed the crime." Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ^ f 10 (quotation omitted). The State 
failed to prove all the elements of the statute beyond a reasonable doubt, because it failed 
to show that Mr. Mohamed understood "work" to mean cocaine, and therefore, that he 
formed the requisite knowledge or intent to arrange a drug transaction. See Hester, 2000 
UT App 159, Tj 9. Therefore, Mr. Mohamed's conviction for arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance should be reversed. 
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C. In the Alternative, Mr. Mohamed's Conviction Should Be Overturned for Plain 
Error. 
It was plain error to allow Mr. Mohamed's conviction on obviously insufficient 
evidence. The plain error doctrine can serve as an alternative to an insufficiency of the 
evidence claim when the claim is not preserved at trial. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 11. It 
"enables the appellate court to balance the need for procedural regularity with the 
demands of fairness" and "to avoid injustice." Id. \ 13 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that (i) an error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined. 
Id. (citation and quotation omitted). 
First, Mr. Mohamed's conviction was based on insufficient evidence, as argued 
above, which constitutes error. Id. <fl 17. Second, this error was "so obvious and 
fundamental that it was plain error to submit the case to the jury." Id. Tf 18. "To establish 
that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, [the defendant] must show that 
the law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made." State v. 
Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 16, 95 P.3d 276. Here, the case law was well settled that the State 
can prove intent through circumstantial evidence, as long as there was "sufficient 
evidence, including . . . inferences that could be drawn therefrom," that the defendant 
possessed the requisite intent. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^} 21-22. Such inferences must 
"have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience." Id.^2\. 
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The State provided the following circumstantial evidence towards intent to arrange 
a drug transaction: Mr. Mohamed was approached by undercover detectives outside a 
homeless shelter and asked if he had some work. R. 130: 60-61. Mr. Mohamed replied 
that he did not but that he would help the detectives find some. Id. at 61. Mr. Mohamed 
requested "work" from others in the area, but with no success. Id. at 62. Mr. Mohamed 
approached Mr. Osmond and spoke to him in a foreign language, after which Mr. 
Osmond initiated a drug transaction with the detective. Id. at 66. This evidence, by itself, 
was insufficient to prove the requisite intent. 
The State's evidence required the inference that Mr. Mohamed understood the 
term "work" to mean cocaine, and, as a corollary, that he conveyed that understanding to 
Mr. Osmond in another language. Given the evidence, this inference is contrary to "logic 
and reasonable human experience." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 21. As explained above, 
nowhere did Mr. Mohamed's words or behavior that night indicate that he knew the 
secret meaning of the word "work" was really cocaine. Furthermore, Mr. Mohamed's 
first language is not English and he required a translator at trial, making his 
understanding of English code words even more suspect. In addition, the State did not 
present any translation of what Mr. Mohamed said to Mr. Osmond. The fact that Mr. 
Osmond proceeded to conduct a transaction for crack cocaine does not prove that Mr. 
Mohamed understood the term "work" to mean cocaine. Given Mr. Mohamed's limited 
English skills and his prior behavior that night, logic and human experience would dictate 
that he continued referring to employment when he spoke with Mr. Osmond, and Mr. 
Osmond made the connection with cocaine on his own. For these reasons, it should have 
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been obvious to the trial court that the inferences drawn by the State's insufficient 
evidence lacked a basis in logic and human experience necessary to prove Mr. 
Mohamed's intent. 
Lastly, the error was harmful and "of such a magnitude that there is reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for [Mr. Mohamed]." State v. Evans, 2001 UT 
22, Tf 16, 20 P.3d 888. An error is harmful if it is prejudicial, and the error is prejudicial if 
but for the trial court's allowance of insufficient evidence, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. See Dean, 2004 UT 63, Tf 22. Clearly, but for the trial court's 
allowance of insufficient evidence by the State, the result of the proceeding would have 
been very different for Mr. Mohamed. Had the trial court recognized this error, it would 
have "forthwith order[ed the defendant] discharged." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 15. For 
these reasons, the court committed plain error with regard to the insufficiency of the 
evidence against Mr. Mohamed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Mohamed respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse his convictions for distributing or arranging to distribute a controlled substance. 
SUBMITTED this 7 ^ _ day of t 5 f r p ^ , 2011. 
~ ' ^ 
^)EBRA M. NELSON 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ISMAIL ABDULLAHI MOHAMED, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 101902145 FS 
Judge: DENO HIMONAS 
Date: December 10, 2010 
PRESENT 
Clerk: kristenl 
Prosecutor: PLATT, CHAD L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): TAN, PATRICK S 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 1, 1974 
Audio 
Tape Number: S44 Tape Count: 11:08 
CHARGES 
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANC -
1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/29/2010 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE 
DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANC a 1st Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than 
five years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Defendant transported from the Utah State Prison.^^ois^li 
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